ABSTRACT To solve the low attack path quantification degree and complex path finding in the industrial Internet of Things, a vulnerability assessment method based on attack graph and maximum flow is proposed. The method takes into account the factors influencing the attack behavior and relationship between network nodes. The attack risk is calculated by common vulnerability scoring system, which increases the attack path quantification degree. The maximum loss flow describes the attack path, evaluates the network vulnerability by maximum loss flow and loss saturation and represents the vulnerability relevance. Avoiding the repeat calculation and obtaining the potential key vulnerability path fast, the augmented road algorithm is used to find optimal attack path within global path. The result shows that the method is feasible and can evaluate the vulnerability and risk path objectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of industrial internet of things technology, more and more internet of things have been applied to real life. In industrial internet of things, it is of great significance to ensure the secrecy and integrity of the transmission. Due to the lack of data protection and high-level attack defense, the nodes in the internet of things are easy to be captured by attackers [1] - [3] . In this attack, attackers capture the network node to obtain the key, and crack the data in the network. The privacy, security, and reliability of the network are destroyed [4] - [7] .
In recent years, many experts and scholars at home and abroad have studied the model of network vulnerability assessment, and have achieved some results. In literature [8] , built the relationship between vulnerabilities by using the idea of Bayesian network separation, proposed a vulnerability assessment method based on Bayesian network. By adding separate nodes between related nodes, the original relationship is decomposed into the relationship between the correlation node and the separation node, and the conditional probability is used to solve the probability calculation error caused by the node correlation. In literature [9] , a vulnerability analysis model based on attack graph has proposed. The model takes the security probability attack graph as the probability of attack graph, and solves the problem of cyclic path probability repetition calculation by the maximum reachable probability and the delete unreachable path. Based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [10] , the safety probability calculation is carried out. The model can adapt to the vulnerability assessment of largescale network, and the time complexity is small. However, the effect of the method on the network security probability is not explained by the correlation between the permeability and the correlation. In literature [11] and [12] , through vulnerability analysis, the safety and reinforcement of network system is proposed according to the idea of repair set. Through the vulnerability and node relationship, construct the initial condition repair set, repair the initial condition by computing the disjunctive normal form of Boolean expression and obtain the best security policy by optimization theory. This method simply considers the relationship between host nodes, but does not consider vulnerability itself and its utilization relation. In addition, the complexity of this method is exponentiation, and it is not suitable for large-scale network scenarios.
In literature [13] , a network vulnerability assessment system based on MulVAL and attack graph is proposed. The system improves the PageRank [14] algorithm and proposes an Asset Rank algorithm that can analyze the large scale attack graph. The algorithms are classified according to the importance of the nodes, and different colors are used to mark different levels, so it is convenient for the security personnel to deal with the problem of vulnerability. Although the system has achieved vulnerability analysis and access control, it lacks consideration for the vulnerability of the weakest level division and vulnerability utilization of the host. In literature [15] , a vulnerability assessment model and method based on attack graph is proposed. The model weights and disassembles the attack and initial conditions, converts the problem of attack and initial condition to the minimum S-T cut set problem, obtains the key vulnerability by seeking path. The time complexity is O (M+N). The model can achieve vulnerability assessment and security reinforcement, but this method does not consider the problem of repeating strategy in the process of solving the best set. In literature [16] , a vulnerability assessment model based on network centrality is proposed. On the basis of CVSS, the model quantifies attack cost of attackers, and analyzes the attack path by quantitative result. Based on the combination of the number of nodes and the connectivity of the node, the critical vulnerability analysis is used to evaluate the vulnerability of the network. But the complexity of the model is too high in the process of solving the key path.
An attack graph can not only describe the attacker's attack scene, but also display the dependency between the vulnerabilities and describe the entire path of the attack. Network vulnerability analysis based on attack graph model is no longer simply considering an isolated vulnerability, but relates the vulnerability of network, and comprehensive analysis and evaluation. Considering the vulnerability and the dependency between them, it can influence the network, and show the attackers' possible attack paths in the form of graph, which is convenient for network administrators to carry out targeted security reinforcement and improve network security level. In this paper, attack graph technology is applied to network vulnerability analysis, and attack graph based evaluation scheme is set up to analyze and evaluate vulnerability from the perspective of network.
The contributions of this paper can be rounded as follows: 1. A vulnerability assessment model based on attack graph is proposed for assessing the vulnerability of industrial internet of things.
2. A vulnerability quantification method based on the largest loss stream is proposed. The mechanism of maximum loss flow is used to characterize the attack path in the network, and the network vulnerability is evaluated according to the maximum loss and the loss of saturation. In the calculation process, when the node size is greater than 300, the time consumption growth rate is significantly less than the breadthfirst search method.
3. A search algorithm based on augmented path global optimal attack path is proposed. Avoiding the repeat calculation and obtaining the potential key vulnerability path fast. A better search solution can be obtained when compared with random augmentations and augmentations based on greedy strategies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Vulnerability analysis model based on attack graph is presented in Section II. Vulnerability quantification based on CVSS is described in Section III. Section IV explains vulnerability attack graph generation process. Optimal attack path determination is described in detail in Section V, and a series of experiments is presented in Section VI. The conclusion is drawn from the research results in Section VII.
II. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS MODEL BASED ON ATTACK GRAPH

A. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
An attack graph is an application of graph theory in the field of network security, which can be used to represent an attack or path, and the node represents the state or property of the host [17] . The attack graph can be divided into state attack graph and attribute attack graph according to the difference of node content. Because the state attack graph will produce ''explosion'' phenomenon due to the number of states of the state. For this reason, this paper uses attribute attack graph to analyze network vulnerability, and proposes a network vulnerability analysis model based on attribute attack graph. The assessment framework is shown in Fig.1 .
In Fig.1 , the evaluation framework based on attack graph vulnerability analysis model consists of five parts: network elements, attack graph construction, vulnerability hazard assessment, attack path generation and vulnerability assessment. The specific process of evaluation includes the following four steps: 1) On the basis of existing network elements, such as vulnerability information, network topology information and attack scenes, traverse and match the vulnerability nodes, and generated attack graphs. After optimizing the attack map, the loop of the graph will be eliminated by using the sub-graph optimization algorithm, and the global attack graph is constructed. 2) According to the score of CVSS, combining with the attack cost and attack profit, calculate the maximum loss. 3) According to the maximum loss, start the augmented path search with depth priority order. the attack path is set up according to the crowding distance, thus the priority order of the attack path is determined, and the best attack path is determined. 4) According to the best attack path, the key fragile links of the network system are determined, which provides the basis for the security and reinforcement of the administrators. 
B. MODEL REPRESENTATION OF VULNERABILITY ATTACK GRAPH
In this paper, the traditional attack map is improved, the CVSS index is included in the vulnerability assessment, and the maximum loss degree is used to quantify the network vulnerability.
In the construction of the model, we assume that the attacker is monotonous. That is, the attacker will not attack the completed attack, and will not discard the condition that the attacker has already obtained. Based on the traditional attack graph model, the vulnerability attack graph model can be represented as a nine tuple. 
, then N p is the node on the attack path, set the logical value of node to true. 2) E is edge set of all node, which is E ⊂ N s × N p → N p × N t , each element e in E represents an attack. 3) C is physical connectivity between nodes, which is C ⊆ (N × N × P t ), P t is the interface linking the nodes. 4) M is a map from edge set E to vulnerability set V , which is M :E → V . In vulnerability attack graph, each attack (e ∈ E) is corresponding to a vulnerability V (e), according to the vulnerability information, the loss capacity LC and loss flow LF are confirmed. 5) D is dependence set of vulnerabilities, which is any element in D, meet d i :v m → v n , it is means if the attacker want to use vulnerability v n , the vulnerability v m is necessary.
6) EXP is the attack cost along with one path. The detailed calculation process and basis are detailed in the 3th section of the vulnerability quantification process. 7) IMP is the attack reward along with one path. The detailed calculation process and basis are detailed in the 3th section of the vulnerability quantification process. 8) LC is the constraint set of loss capacity on edge E.
The loss capacity of edge eLC (e) is the maximum loss of whole system when attack with vulnerability corresponding to edge e. The calculation basis is the content of CVSS. The specific process is detailed in the 3th section of the vulnerability quantification. 9) LF is the loss flow set on edge E, which lf e ∈ LF is the actual loss flow by attack with edge e, e ∈ E. The loss flow is affected by the attack process and changes as the attack changes. The loss flow and loss capacity also satisfy the capacity constraint and the conservation of flow theorem. Theorem 1 (Capacity Constraint): The loss flow of an arbitrary edge e is less than equal to its loss capacity, which is
Prove: In the actual attack, whether an attacker can successfully exploit the vulnerability is related to the individual ability of the attacker and the protection of the network. Therefore, the damage to the system by exploiting the vulnerability is not only related to the CVSS vulnerability score, but also affected by the success probability of the vulnerability p (e) ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, lf (e) = p (e) * lc (e). Therefore, The capacity constraint theorem for the loss capacity and loss capacity on the side e is established. 
Theorem 2 (Flow Conservation):
The inflow and outflow traffic satisfies the following relationship for any node n p in the node set N p of the path.
Prove: lf + n p is the sum of the loss to attack the node n p .lf − n p is potential loss to next node after attack node n p successfully. According to the monotonicity hypothesis before, the loss caused by the attack will be passed along the attack path and kept in and out of each node.
III. VULNERABILITY QUANTIFICATION BASED ON CVSS
In order to solve the problem of the low degree of attack path quantization and change the calculation mode of the original attack probability, the CVSS scale of the vulnerability is introduced in this paper. CVSS is currently the most widely used vulnerability scoring system [18] . It is part of the secure content automation protocol (SCAP), and is supported by the US national vulnerability Library (NVD) [19] .
This article consists of the basic metric group, the time measure group, and the environment measure group to form the CVSS scale. The main function of the time measure group and the environment measure group is to modify the basic metric group. Because this chapter focuses on the vulnerability assessment of network system, in order to simplify the problem, we do not consider the impact of time measurement group and environment measure group on quantization. We consider only the elements of basic measurement group on the path loss flow calculation. The measurement elements and values of the basic metric group are shown as shown in Table 1 .
The following concepts and quantization processes used in the process of generating the vulnerability attack map are given.
Let p be an attack path, e is an edge on the path, the attack cost EXP and attack reward IMP can be calculated by formula(3) and (4) .
EXP (e) = 20 * AV * AC * AT (4)
LC (e) is the difference between attack reward IMP (e) and attack cost EXP (e)
Maximum loss d m is the max flow loss in the preceding attack. The calculation process is:
Loss saturation γ is the ratio of maximum loss d m to the sum of loss capacity in the preceding attack. The calculation process is:
Node connectivity is represented by C n i , n j , pt , n i and n j is connectedness node, pt is connection port. The whole network connected matrix M c is shown in formula (8) .
The element at row n and column m is the connectivity between node n and node m. If nodes is connect, the element value is pt, otherwise the value is n. If nodes is physical connected, but not logical connected, the value is y.
IV. VULNERABILITY ATTACK GRAPH GENERATION
The formation process of the vulnerability attack map includes three parts: the traversing of the fragile node, the generation of the attack graph, and the generation of the global attack graph by the sub-graph. The following three parts are described respectively.
A. TRAVERSAL AND MATCHING OF VULNERABILITY NODES
The basic idea of traversing the vulnerability node is to match the condition of the vulnerability node attack process. An attack tree is generated for each vulnerability node that consists of only the current vulnerability node and its sub nodes.
Before the vulnerability of nodes is traversed, the attack mode is instantiated based on the network connectivity C and the vulnerability information V . The instantiated pattern is expressed in EP, including the preconditions and consequences of the attack. EP = Cdn_P∪Cdn_N , Cdn_P is attack precondition set, Cdn_N is attack consequence set. Then call the vulnerability node matching algorithm VNodesMatch, shown in Algorithm 1, to generate vulnerability node. VNodesMatch is a recursive algorithm, include three parameters, PNodes, EP and Node. The output is VNodes and edge set E. VNodes is vulnerability node set, Node is new node at each iterator. At initial state, VNodes and E are empty, all nodes are in the PNodes. EP is a set of all attack preconditions and consequences. The element in EP should be removed when the element was used until EP is empty.
First in EP, find out if there is an available attack instance. If this instance exists, find out if there is an attack instance with the new node Node as the premise of the attack, and the other premises of the attack instance are also conformed, indicating that the node is an usable vulnerability node. Then, put the vulnerability node into the VNodes, find out the previous node, build the edge e with previous node and add it to the edge set E. If the result node of the attack is not in the former node set PNodes, the node is added to the set PNodes of the former node and the temporary node set TNodes. Establish the edge of the node and the consequence node and put it in the edge set E and remove the attack instance from the EP. Finally, call the method VNodesMatch for each element in set TNodes until the set EP is empty.
B. ATTACK GRAPH GENERATION
The generation of the vulnerability attack graph is based on the traversal of the last section of the vulnerability node, which will generate the attack sub-tree, merge and eliminate the loop process. The process of generating the vulnerability attack map includes two processes of the attack sub-tree (the vulnerability node) and the attack graph optimization.
In the process of merging the vulnerability nodes, firstly go through the vulnerability node set PNodes, then search the edge which start with the current node, get the node which end with the edge and take the node as a root node to generate global attack graph VAG. This process is relatively simple, not too much to explain, and then focus on the optimization of the attack map process.
After the attack target is determined, the whole attack graph is searched by the target node as the starting point of the reverse depth. The optimized algorithm is recursive, includes four parameters n s , n t , VAG and output result OAG. VAG is global attack graph, n s is target node, n t is child node of target node, OAG is optimal attack graph to be generated.
The algorithm starts with the target node n s , search the vulnerability node VNodes outside the ring from the attack full graph VAG and the side of the node, put the edges and nodes to the optimal attack graph OAG. Then, set the target node n s as the parent of current node, the child node n t as the target node. Call the function OptGraph recursively to traverse all the node.
When the algorithm searches for a certain path, if the node is already in the optimal attack graph, it indicates that the node has been extended, and add the edge of the node n t to the subgraph OAG. In order to do this, the algorithm uses the set TP to record the traversal of the former node on a certain path. If the node appears in the collection TP, it indicates that the loop appears in the path, and the search is continued according to the other path.
C. ALGORITHM COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
The generation of vulnerability attack graph consists of two parts: the traversal matching of the vulnerability node and the generation of the attack graph. The number of elements in the set of attack instances EP is n ep , and the number of elements of the reachable precursor property PNodes is n p , and the number of elements of the edge set E is n e . In the process of traversal of the vulnerability node, the n p times of the matching algorithm need to be called recursively, and each call requires EP traversal of the n ep . So, the complexity of the frailty node traversal matching algorithm is O n ep · n p . In the process of attack graph generation and optimization, algorithm 2's step 3 recursively calls along the edge of the attack path, the number of edges is n e , which is the complexity of algorithm, that is O (n e ). The time complexity of the generation algorithm of the vulnerability attack graph is O (n e ) + O n ep · n p = O n ep · n p .
V. OPTIMAL ATTACK PATH DETERMINATION A. MAXIMUM LOSS FLOW ALGORITHM
The attack graph built through the last section can record attack and attack process very well, and analyze the vulnerability of the system through its purpose and intention. Therefore, the maximum flow method can be used to calculate the When the attack path of the vulnerability attack graph is generated, the attack graph is converted to a weighted matrix T w . The value of the element T w [i, j] in the matrix is the loss flow on the e (i, j) between node i and node j, that is, lc (e).
The algorithm starts from the root N s of the optimized attack graph OAG, and searches for the path of the target node N t according to the depth first. According to the formula (3) and (4), the return and attack returns of each search path are calculated and the reward matrix T d is generated. The specific content of T d is shown as a formula (9) . Each column col (i) = [IMP (i) , EXP (i) , Index (i)] in the matrix represents the return of the attack, the overhead, and the number of the path of the path i.
Each attack path is sorted by the function MT _Sort. The sort is based mainly on the overhead of the attack EXP and the return IMP. The sorting result of the function MT _Sort determines the augmented order of the loss flow in the graph. The attacker will continue to search forward according to the augmented order, and then calculate the loss saturation γ and the maximum loss d m . The pseudo code description of the maximum loss flow algorithm MaxLossFlow is shown in algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Maximum Loss Flow Algorithm
Input: matrix with weight T w , root node n s Output: loss saturation γ , maximum loss d m , key path P 1 Initialize n s , P 2 P = Path S eek (n s ) The main function of Path_Seek in algorithm 3 is to find the possible attack path. The process of searching for algorithms is to find an augmented edge. The augmented edges of the algorithm are defined as the edges that conform to the capacity constraint theorem 1. Because the attackers are greedy in the actual attack process, they hope to increase the probability of success through as many ways and means as possible, and reach the goal with the least steps. To this end, the algorithm uses a forward depth first method to search. First, the algorithm starts from the initial node n s to find an augmented edge. In the augmented process, the state of each of the direct child nodes n c of the n s is checked. If the direct child node n c is not labeled as access, the n c is used as the next hop, and the side between the n s and the n c is placed in the path p.
On the other hand, if n c has been accessed, it selects its direct child node to check until the path reaches the target node. The algorithm uses the roulette algorithm RWS to mark the access of nodes. It uses three colors of white, gray and black to indicate the three states that nodes are not accessed, need to continue searching, and have been visited.
C. MULTI-OBJECTIVE AUGMENTED ROAD SORTING
The main function of the function MT _Sort in algorithm 3 is the multi-objective ordering of the augmented path. Function MT _Sort is sorted by calculating crowding distance. The calculation method of crowding distance is shown in formula (10) . 
The pseudo code of algorithm MT _Sort is shown in algorithm 5.
D. ALGORITHM COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
The optimal path determination algorithm based on the maximum flow includes three parts: the maximum loss flow algorithm, the path search algorithm and the multi-objective augmented road sorting algorithm. The number of elements of the vulnerability node VNodes is n v , and the number of bars of the attack path is n p . According to algorithm 3, it is known that its time consumption is mainly the traversing process of path P, and its complexity is O n p . According to algorithm 4, it is known that the time consumption is mainly a recursive process with node as the root, and the number of algorithms is n 2 v , and its complexity is O n 2 v . The time complexity of the augmented road sorting algorithm 5 is O n p log n p . It can be seen that the time complexity of the optimal path generation algorithm is
VI. EXPERIMENTAL SIMULATION A. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
The network topology of the experimental environment selection is shown in Fig.2 . It is composed of Virtualization Server and physical server, including 2 virtualization servers and 1 physical servers. The configuration and function information of the server are shown in Table 2 . In real life, the purpose of all kinds of attackers to carry out network attacks is to obtain all kinds of resources and data on the server [20] - [22] . In the experiment, it is assumed that an attacker takes the Root permissions in the target database PM1 as the ultimate goal to obtain business data.
B. AN ATTACK GRAPH OF THE EXPERIMENTAL SCENE
In order to achieve this goal, an attacker can attack by a variety of ways and means. The first way, attackers can scan through Web Vulnerability Scanner [23] , XScan [24] and other tools to find the SQL injection vulnerability on the web server VM21 (2011-2688). Through this vulnerability, the attacker gets the user rights of the VM21 and establishes a connection with the database server PM21 on the VM21 with a legitimate identity. Then through the (2012-2122) and (2010-2693) vulnerabilities on the server PM21, the access mechanism is bypassed, and the local authority is carried out. Finally get the root permissions of the database server PM21. Second way, attacker can also improve VM22 permissions through a vulnerability (2012-6067) and (2011-4130) on the file server VM22, then infiltrate to the database server PM21, and finally get the root permissions. Third way, attackers reach the ultimate goal by directly attacking the database server PM21.
As a result of the above description, it can be seen that an attacker can achieve a goal in a variety of ways. According to the definition of the attack graph model and the attack graph generation algorithm in the 4th section, the attack graph of the experimental scene can be obtained, and the specific information is shown in Fig.3 .
C. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF ATTACK PATH SEARCH
The last section has already given the attack map of the experimental scene, and then we are looking for the best attack path. Firstly, the performance of the path search algorithm is compared and analyzed. From the 5th section of path search algorithm, we can see that the depth loss algorithm based on depth first proposed in this paper is consistent with the time complexity of the wired search algorithm. In order to verify the rationality of the maximum loss flow algorithm, the experimental simulation method is used to compare this method and the breadth first augmented road search [25] - [27] . In the process of simulation, the scale of the nodes is set to 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600 respectively, and the search time is compared. The comparison results are shown in Fig.4 . From the contrast results of the graph, it can be seen that both of the two are increasing with the size of the node, and the time of the algorithm is increasing. But we can see that when the size of nodes is larger than 300, the depth loss algorithm based on depth first proposed in this paper, the time consumption growth rate is significantly less than that based on breadth first search algorithm.
D. ANALYSIS OF QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
As described in Section 2 and 3, this article incorporates CVSS indicators into the vulnerability assessment process. The attack cost and reward are introduced into the attack graph, and a vulnerability assessment model based on attack graph is established, so that we can grasp the overall vulnerability of the network and identify the key vulnerable links. In order to evaluate the vulnerability of the sample scenario, we calculate the attack cost and reward on each side of the attack map based on table I given in the 3th section, and then calculate the attack cost and reward on different attack paths. Attack cost and reward on each side, as shown in Table 3 , attack cost and reward on each attack path as shown in Table 4 . Tables 3 and 4 show attack cost and reward on each side and path of the attack diagram, respectively. Because of the different vulnerabilities on each side, the cost and reward of the attack are not the same. The attack path, which consists of different sides, has different reward. Through the data in the table, we know that attackers will always choose the attack cost with the least cost, but will get the most aggressive attack path. Therefore, the vulnerability assessment of the network should also take into account the characteristics of the attacker.
In order to better compare the attack paths, according to the data in Table 4 , the cost and reward contrast curves of the attack path can be drawn, as shown in Fig.5 .
From the graph, we cannot easily compare any two of the paths in the path. For example, path R1 and R4, although R1's attack returns are lower than R4, the corresponding attack overhead R1 is also lower than R4. To this end, the multiobjective sorting algorithm in the 5th section is used to analyze and sort the path. In the attack graph model, the order of attack is the same as the augmented order of the loss flow. In the process of multi-objective sorting, the use formula (10) is used to calculate the crowding distance and order it. The result of the sorting is the augmented order in Table 4 . According to the results of multi-objective ordering, the augmented process of the loss flow in the experimental network is shown in the order of Figure 6 .
From Figure 6 , it can be seen that the attacker started from the path R1 and augmented in sequence R1 → R4 → R2 → R3. Firstly, the attacker increases the loss flow value on the edge of the R1. In the process of enlargement, if any edge loss traffic reaches the upper limit of capacity, it will continue to augment other paths until the end of path R1 is extended, until all paths cannot find the edge that continues to increase the loss traffic. At this time, the network reaches the maximum flow and satisfies the law of conservation of flow.
In order to better evaluate the crowding distance sorting scheme based on maximum loss of flow, with the increase of random [28] and greedy strategy [29] based on augmented method comparison. Fig.7 is an unordered and random augmentation method, which randomly selects the edge in the augmented process. The order in which the path is augmented is R4 → R1 → R2 → R3. Fig.8 is an augmented process of adopting a greedy strategy. In the process of augmentation, it is the choice to augment the largest edge of the current loss flow. It can be seen from the figure that the order of augmentation is R2 → R1 → R3 → R4.
The two methods can all solve their maximum loss flow. The maximum loss flow obtained by the unordered stochastic augmentation is 16, and the maximum loss flow in the way of greedy augmentation is 16.7. The detailed comparison between the two methods and the method based on the crowding distance sorting is shown in Table 5 .
The zero flow in the table represents an attack path that the attacker completely ignores. Compared with the other two VOLUME 6, 2018 schemes, the maximum loss flow scheme based on crowding distance sorting is the best result. Mainly based on the following reasons:
1) The maximum loss flow scheme of crowding distance ranking, and the maximum loss flow value of the best path is obtained. 2) There is no zero-flow phenomenon in the final result of the solution, which is in accordance with the actual attack process.
3) The final result of this method includes four sides of full flow, and the loss saturation is also the largest of the three schemes.
VII. CONCLUSION
This study focuses on vulnerability assessment of industrial internet of things and proposes a new vulnerability assessment method. Many experts and scholars quantify and assess vulnerability based on Bayesian network separation, attack graph and network centricity. However, there are some problems that the attack path has a low degree of quantization and a complicated way of seeking paths. This study proposes a vulnerability graph model based on attack graph and a vulnerability algorithm based on maximum loss stream. The CVSS scale is used to quantify and calculate the potential risk of attack path. The mechanism of maximum loss flow is used to characterize the attack path in the network, and the network vulnerability is evaluated according to the maximum loss and loss saturation. The augmented path is used to estimate the global path searched for and determine the optimal attack path. The proposed vulnerability assessment method solves the problems such as the portrayal of vulnerability relation and repeated computation of attack path, and realizes the fast 
